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Unfinished Business: WAR
I outlined my concerns in this paper about war to a friend, Rob K. The question is whether there are are any ethical questions beyond biology, whether people are "intentional" (in Prof Dennett's terms).
RK told me things are as they are because all the saints died. I immediately rejected that synopsis, because it implies things have always got worse (evil always wins) or, simply, might makes right. It could also mean that things got better because saints died. Whatever he meant (does he know?), I take his comment as poetic.
I believe history does have a direction, at least with respect to homo sapiens sapiens. The advent of intelligent species on Earth was "accidental," the result Darwinian evolution. While Darwinian evolution could be random in the large, there is nothing to prevent orderly evolutionary sub-sequences. A chaotic system can coalesce from utter randomness around a focal point, and then behave according to a set of organizing principles for some time, before once again dissipating into nothingness. The Main Sequence of stars is like that; maybe the Universe and homo sapiens sapiens too.
Wars don't just happen. They have causes, or so say the participants.
Historians would like them to have causes, because wars are important events - turning points - that "cause" other events following them. If wars were not important, if they were like everyday squabbles, history would be boring or perplexing, maybe directionless.
There must be something more to them, because wars involve so many people, and thereby aggregate or focus individual purposes. Even if wars are not causes or consequences, surely they are markers because of their size.
If wars have reasons, some might be just and others not. Just wars cannot occur without reasons, but a lack of reasons is not the same thing as saying wars are unjust. Maybe wars are neither, but most wars have a justification.
Many justifications are given for war. Some of these justifications are pretexts, others casus belli. Sometimes a war is founded on an excuse, or certain events or facts are cited as an excuse for war. How a war is presented depends upon speakers and hearers; we seldom get the same story from aggressors and defenders. One man's pretext is another's casus belli. Then again, the other guys' actions are an excuse for what I am about to do, and justification for what I have done.
In the jumble of words and arguments about war, I think the basic terms which have ethical content are reasons, causes and justifications. Some of these terms are complicated by time references. Justifications, particularly, are usually markedly different before, during and after a war. Causes are much less time dependent, as they are usually presented more formally, often in legal settings (particularly as casus belli). Causes are more thought through, because they are intended to be recorded in history. Reasons are more general, and the least time dependent of these terms regarding war. Reasons are adduced in arguments supporting causes and justification, because reasons have an ethical and epistemological content. Reasons presuppose an intellectual framework, some sort of theory about the world which binds decisions, actions and facts. Reasons determine what is or isn't a legitimate cause of war, even if they are more loosely, and often falsely, applied in justifications.
Reasons, causes and justifications are words and ideas usually found in arguments for and against war. They are the armamentaria of fighting words. They are important, at least for humans and possibly any intelligent, intentional creatures (ET), because they become the history which is taught to succeeding generations. They are important because they are the prelude to war, contribute to the prosecution of war, and, after a war, provoke endless arguments (and more wars). Long after the battles end, fighting words keep alive "the cause;" for example, in the States of the Confederacy, the Old South. Those words do not have a merely intellectual import; they profoundly affect millions of lives every day, for better and worse.
Fighting words are important in the transition from rationality to some other condition. Wars start when disputes cannot be arbitrated, when reason and generosity fail. Going to war amounts to throwing the dice; i.e., deciding the contest of wills by 'might makes right.' This is a truly ancient mechanism of resolving disputes, and probably antedates reason and diplomacy. At the bottom of many gruesome Medieval tortures is the principle that a pure heart and right thinking will prevail over evil. In magical thinking, rightness strengthens the will and the muscles. In ancient and modern times, during periods of high civilization, that sort of thinking has been rejected in favor of discussion and negotiation. For us, talk must come before deeds. But, when talks fail our purpose, fighting words serve as incantations that conjure up the ancient beast within and move us to war. Fighting words remove the veneer of civilization and reduce us to the Darwinian creatures we always were. Thus, homo sapiens tyrannus.
The family of "Justification" includes pretexts, excuses and their kindred, which are offered as the (supposed) reasons offered for actions taken. Much of the time we use these words in a derogatory way, but they can also simply reflect the truth or the facts. An excuse can be honorable, although most of the time it is merely exculpatory. Pretexts are almost always propaganda; i.e., the offered reason or "cover story" for doing something. Pretexts only become binding upon acceptance. Unacceptable pretexts are frequently replaced by another pretext; i.e., a pretext may be a "trial balloon." Pretexts and excuses fall under the heading of justification, because they are offered explanations. The central tendency of "justification" is something offered, true or not, accepted or not.
Justification is also associated with an emotional need to gain acceptance; it isn't enough to go out and do it. We don't need justifications, pretexts or excuses in ordinary situations. I am rarely asked why I am going to the store. When that question is raised, an adequate answer might be "to get some milk" or "they're having a sale." Purchasing something I need or want, or scouting out bargains, requires no further explanation: these are everyday human activities well understood or felt by everyone. Most people can say to themselves, 'I do the same thing,' or 'I'm the same way,' so they do not feel the need for further explanation. If there were some lack of clarity, and further questions ensued, I might say 'I need food' or 'I am curious about prices' or 'I am stocking up for the winter.' At some point, it should be obvious that my action - going to the store - is what creatures like me do, unless the inquirer is so totally alien from my existence that I have to explain everything. Nonetheless, even children's "whys?" end somewhere.
Explanations stop when those who seek them are satisfied. There is a presumption that those who inquire accept, or acquiesce in, actions for which they do not seek further explanation and do not actively prevent. This does not mean inquirers approve or condone those actions; it merely means they stand aside or even absent themselves from the scene. Whether or not any explanations offered are satisfactory to those present and concerned, they are still subject to ethical questions that might be put on further examination.
On the other hand, justifying explanations start when something unusual occurs; when behavior is not what was expected. Justification proceeds upon an assumed challenge to whatever is proposed or being done. Thus, if I am going to the store as an occasion to see my lover and cheat on my spouse, the question "Where are you going?" becomes ominous, laden with foreboding. Good actors will respond as any innocent would, 'To the store!' but many people will give a peculiar reply. Either the tone of voice, added or subtracted detail, or some other variation from the standard answer can be a clue to the fiction being told. If a non-standard answer is detected, that leads to the next question, "Why? [Didn't you already go there today?]," and, then, "What is going on?".
A cheat may be given away in the tone of voice when announcing "I am going to the store!" Maybe the announcement is too loud, too soft, shaky, too hasty or too slow. In this way, others are prompted to ask what is being done. A first line of defense against discovery is often an excuse. Excuses are made in situations that require a certain behavior that cannot be performed as required. An excuse is made in the way of an exception to the rules: 'I'll let you off this time, but don't let me catch you here again.' When the cheat tries to explain going to the store, pleading the need for milk, the plea offers an excuse: 'I am going to the store yet again because [ ... excuse ...]'
Normally, we accept excuses for irregular behavior; e.g., the doctor's note stating illness on a given day, so we didn't attend school, work or other promised appointment. The excuse is an instance of a class of exceptions to the rule, such as 'you cannot squeeze blood from a stone.' If someone is unable to perform the expected behavior, due to some acceptable condition, that person is excused. The excuse depends upon recognition and understanding of some non-intentional universe of behavior. The dead cannot work, and the ill don't learn well, regardless of what their intentions may have been. So, it doesn't matter whether we try to apply the rules to them, because they are unresponsive. It is this bit of knowledge that creates a class of excuses.
The Merriam-Webster 11th Collegiate Dictionary say this of an excuse:
"1a: to make apology for b: to try to remove blame from
2: to forgive entirely or disregard as of trivial import : regard as excusable <graciously excused his tardiness>
3a: to grant exemption or release to <was excused from jury duty> b: to allow to leave <excused the class>
4: to serve as excuse for : JUSTIFY <nothing can excuse such neglect>
"synonyms EXCUSE, CONDONE, PARDON, FORGIVE mean to exact neither punishment nor redress. EXCUSE may refer to specific acts especially in social or conventional situations or the person responsible for these <excuse an interruption> <excused them for interrupting>. Often the term implies extenuating circumstances <injustice excuses strong responses>. CONDONE implies that one overlooks without censure behavior (as dishonesty or violence) that involves a serious breach of a moral, ethical, or legal code, and the term may refer to the behavior or to the agent responsible for it <a society that condones alcohol but not narcotics>. PARDON implies that one remits a penalty due for an admitted or established offense <pardon a criminal>. FORGIVE implies that one gives up all claim to requital and to resentment or vengeful feelings <could not forgive their rudeness>.
So, excuses let people off the hook, in situations where a certain action was expected, but not performed. They are an acceptable justification; boiler plate that fills a paragraph in history. They do not apply to new and unusual situations. Excuses are similar to the legal precedents familiar to trial lawyers and judges; they are the results of previous trials. In this sense, excuses are always conventional.
Can a war be justified by an excuse? Translated, is there a conventional situation for which war is an allowable remedy? Here, most people say "yes," as when war is undertaken in defense against attacks.
Is it really as easy as all that? Are defensive wars justified, even if not just or not justly carried out? What if the defenders are being punished from some awful transgression: does a criminal have a right of defense?
If there are excusable wars, they must be carried out under rules of war. It is not enough to say 'wars in this case are excusable;' one must also specify the limits of the war which is excused. This is inherent in our notion of "excuse," that it is limited and specific, predefined and conventional. In this category might be for example, the international intervention in Bosnia. A decade ago, intervention in Rwanda might have been justified by an excuse - preventing genocide. If wars are carried out in a controlled manner as generally agreed for ethical purposes, it appears they may be excused. (I cannot think of why not.)
Corollary: Excusable wars are not normal, acceptable events or behavior. The fact that an excuse is required shows that another state of affairs was expected, one which did not include the war. This, however, does not imply that all wars are irregular, unwanted or unexpected, as inexcusable wars may have another justification or status.
The trick about excuses is how they are applied. The cheater attempts to appropriate our usual understanding of excuses to allow behavior that is otherwise forbidden or discouraged, or avoid service that is required. The excuse then becomes the "cover story", or pretext, for illicit or unscrupulous behavior. As Merriam-Webster has it,
"a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs"
Pretexts always involve a lie - an untruth or denial of fact - and also the intention to deceive. (Liars don't have to intend deceit; they can be merely untruthful.) Pretexts may be an abuse of excuses by cheaters, or an attempt to make the inexcusable appear otherwise or to minimize bad behavior. The basic strategy is to convince the assumed judges that the behavior is excusable, so not punishable. A flourish on that strategy is the notion that the cheater is a victim or an addict, as in 'he hit me first' or 'I can't help myself.'
Famous pretexts include Hitler's elaborate attempt to blame the Poles for Germany's Sept., 1939 invasion of Poland. Germans outfitted as Poles attacked a German border station. This instance of "Polish" aggression was the pretext of ordering the previously massed German army forward. Germany's aggression was presented as excusable self-defense.
Hitler also used a pretext in scrapping the 1919 Versailles Treaty when re-entering the Rhineland. Germany was the supposed victim of abuses under Versailles, so entitled to recovery of assets. While there was some truth to that particular claim, the same sort of pretext was later used to commit the Holocaust. According to Hitler, Germany was the victim of a plot by "International Jewry."
Common criminals often try the 'I cannot help myself' defense. Thus, Dan White's infamous "Twinkie" defense of his murders of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk relied on his supposed reduced culpability because of the bad effects of Hostess Twinkies. The defense attempted to excuse White, using well-established precedents concerning incompetent defendants. Despite the partial success of that defense, many witnesses to the event (including myself) continue to believe White presented an ex post facto pretext for his crimes. One can view the defense that way, even conceding that White was either insane or extremely disturbed. (He wasn't so hopelessly, criminally insane that he failed to provide for his defense.)
Pretexts are more interesting when the lie and deceit attempt to disguise the inexcusable; i.e., when the pretext is about something we all know is indefensible. During the last two years, we have heard many pretexts for the American Conquest of Iraq. Examples include the claim that Iraq was purchasing yellowcake, that Iraq was amassing chemical and biological weapons and that an Iraqi attack against the United States was imminent. All of those claims have turned out to be false in fact, and probably deceitfully made as well, even if certain members of the Bush Administration actually believed those claims.
The aim of such pretexts is almost always to hide the real intentions of those making them, and confuse the targets of the activity. Thus the cheating spouse claims to go to the store to avoid discovery, and also, by indirection, to lead the suspicious on a "wild goose chase." In the context of war, pretexts are part of the strategy for waging it. The hope is to undermine the will of the enemy, by presenting oneself in the best possible light, thus justified in all one does. Pretexts, when successful, misguide the opponents or victims in the time, place and method of prevention and defense. On the other hand, pretexts discovered earn disrespect and cynicism, but frequently not much else. So, it is worth trying them, as , at least, they slow down worthy targets.
Now, one man's pretext is another's bona fides. Opponents will claim one's statements are merely pretexts, and not at all the truth. In support of that derogatory claim, opponents will bring forward evidence of one's bad dealings and miscued activities, or anything else that reduces credibility. The object of turning a (reasonably) truthful statement into a pretext is, of course, to avoid punishment or other negative consequence of the statements made or actions proposed. Criminal defendants are notorious - at least in movies - for offering pretexts (not just excuses) for their crimes. So, distortion and confusion are forms of pretext used by defenders. Pretext is not solely the property of aggressors.
The goal of justification is the satisfaction of inquirers.
Justifying is the ambitious activity of making arguments that show the justice of what one did, is doing or will do. Justifications are the result of this activity, or the name we give to the body of work called "justifying." I take the root word to be "justify," which Merriam-Webster tells us is,
1a: to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable b (1) : to show to have had a sufficient legal reason (2) : to qualify (oneself) as a surety by taking oath to the ownership of sufficient property
2a archaic : to administer justice to b archaic : ABSOLVE c : to judge, regard, or treat as righteous and worthy of salvation
The related definition of "justification" starts with,
1: the act, process, or state of being justified by God
2a: the act or an instance of justifying : VINDICATION b : something that justifies
Justifying occurs with reference to some sort of final judgement, and aims for absolution or vindication. Absolution is sought for an infraction of the rules, whereas vindication affirms the righteousness of the one accused or under suspicion. Either way, the need for justifying implies some level of guilt in the one being examined.
Justification can be taken as a generalization of making an excuse, for both are presumably rule-driven (thus, conventional). The difference is, I think, justifications are heard in a formal way or by higher authorities, whereas excuses are made individually or at lower levels. For this reason, I include excuses in the class of justifications. Someone can be justified by an excuse.
Justifications include pretexts, since pretexts may be offered as reasons supporting a desired conclusion. If the pretext is false - and by its definition we assume that - it will be part of a false justification. The purpose of justifying is to reach a conclusion, a judgement, including the attempt by a guilty defense to reach a wrong finding (of innocent).
Justifications are most often made by those under attack or indictment, or being examined for possible infractions. Thus, we think of them as being emotionally defensive in nature. The putative criminal is full of justifications (and umbrage) as he tries to wriggle out of conviction. As a result of this common situation, played endlessly on TV, we come to think of people who justify as guilty. Thus, by extension, defendants' representatives (lawyers, mostly) are "shysters," "weasels," "sharks and the like. Those offering justifications have a double burden: proving their innocence and removing suspicion, the assumption of guilt.
But, need we say this? What is to be determined is guilt or innocence in the judgement, the trial. Justifying can be for good or ill. In other words, people are innocent until proven guilty. Both the guilty and innocent have a right to a defense, to justify themselves to the examiner. At least that's so according to our common law.
Justification may be an argument full of excuses and pretexts, but it may also be more. The argument may present grounds which are not merely a matter of precedent, convention or concoction. For my purposes, these reasons fall into two categories: causes and reasons.
Causes are, as I would have it, "natural causes;" the chain of facts or events which are thought to be linked according to some logical explanation (theory or hypothesis). Thus, the glass fell to earth when I get it go, due to the force of gravity. Wars are often said to have causes, which can also be their justification. If a war is justified by causes, it is being treated as if it were a natural phenomenon, and not the result of "voluntary" choices.
Reasons are moral laws, or ethical principles, which are the basis of claiming a just war. Wars that are excused, or waged under an acceptable pretext, or are somehow caused (in the foregoing sense), are just amoral. "Just" is a moral term, so it requires a moral premise.
A just war is justified by the reasons presented; an unjust war is unjustified. The peace question - "What if they gave a war, and no one came?" - is only sensible with respect to wars that have reasons. Implicit in the notion of reason is choice; for , if there is no choice, then a war is only caused.
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April 15 - 21, 2004
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Last update: 11/02/2007
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