Unfinished Business: War 2

My solution is this: follow the Ottoman example. Iraq should be partitioned into three autonomous regions under United Nations supervision. The UN and the US should find suitable ISLAMIC powers that would police the territories, and placate the Turkish fear of Kurds. We might get lucky; we might be able to put Iraq back together someday. It just isn't going to happen now.

The alternative is a consuming guerrilla war. In this scenario, eventually, Iraq becomes another repressive Shi'ite Islamic republic.

All of the "reasons" for the American conquest of Iraq have now been falsified, no matter how long we stay there. We should cut our losses, get out now, but do the best we can in assisting others in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Vietnam Then, Iraq Now

I don't know why my crimes of 1966 - not giving the seminar - are coming back to haunt me now. I hope that is not the reason we are at war in Iraq; i.e., I don't want to be the cause of it. Nevertheless, there are similarities in two lives, two times separated by 38 years.

This year and that year were times of escalation in the wars. The casualties in Vietnam, 1966, were just beginning to mount up; they were just a bit higher than the casualties in Iraq, 2004. There was a significant anti-war protest movement, but the majority of Americans supported the war. America was divided, and becoming more divided. The government was determined to leave Vietnam and Iraq, so it said, after achieving "peace with honor."

War is a very hard subject for me to think about. I found it too difficult and inconvenient in 1966, and still confusing in 2004. My concern, as philosopher, is with ethical issues associated with war, not with the prosecution or results of war. War raises these ethical questions (among others):

Is war innate to humans, like eating and sleeping, thus amoral?

 

Are there "causes" of war? What is the nature of those causes?

 

Are any wars just? Is "just" the same as "right" or "good"?

 

Is there a difference between the ethics of defense and offense? Is the defender always just?

 

Are wars ever ethical? Can they be moral?

 

Is pacifism ever justified?

 

Is there any difference between combatants and bystanders?

 

Why are there rules of war, and what should they be?

 

Who is to blame for a war? What responsibility may be assigned the parties? Does blame allow the victors to punish the losers?

 

Is there a "right" of conquest? Or "rights" derived from Conquest?

At the start, I don't the think the answers to these questions are clear cut or simple. There are too many cases - thousands of wars in recorded history - to consider, even in a long book. According to one or another commentator, almost every war was justified, or at least not wholly immoral. Others say some wars were immoral and unnecessary, while others were justified. A minority think war is always evil. Some people believe defensive wars are justified, whereas others say it depends on circumstances.

There is no settled opinion about war generally or wars in particular. In the 20^th century, we made great progress following the World Wars in regulating war by the institution of the League of Nations and then the United Nations. Since World War II, there has been an increasing common understanding about which uses of force are legitimate, and which are not. As a result of increasing oversight, war is gradually becoming more unacceptable. The Cold War and the latest Islamic terrorism have forced people everywhere to realize violence cannot go unchecked and unpunished.

So, hopefully, we are headed toward a more peaceful, less violent, human world. In this era, our ideas and feelings about war are evolving. I hope my work will contribute to a future in which the scourge of war will be a thing of the past.

Human Nature

Lots of things are attributed to "human nature." When people say 'it's just human nature,' most often that amounts to a verbal shrugging of the shoulders. The further explanation is: 'It's there. It happens. I can't do anything about it. So what?' "Human nature" is a sinkhole into which we throw all the human behavior we simply accept, and refuse to discuss or analyze or evaluate.

Unfortunately, every so often, some spoil sport comes along who asks, 'what is human nature,' or 'what did you mean by that?' I am not going to be that spoiled in this article, but I do ask whether war is simply a facet of "human nature?" In particular, is it something we cannot do anything about?

Obviously, my answer is going to be 'yes' and 'no.' Of course war is an aspect of "human nature," whatever that is. Somewhere in the grab-bag called "human" you will find war. You will find it in all of recorded history. It probably existed before recording began. Since war is an organized, social activity, it could go back as far as the settlement of the first villages. That would imply war has been around for at least 10 and, maybe, 20 or 50 millennia. That certainly makes it a very antique component of human behavior; far more established than swiping credit cards.

Does that mere fact of war's antiquity make it an ineradicable, possibly unchangeable, aspect of "human nature?" If I thought so, this discussion would end right here. I have a vested interest in saying 'no,' because I believe the matter can be analyzed and evaluated. That belief is based on evidence that war has changed over time (as indicated above), and that there are indeed things we can do about it.

So, I start with the premise that war is a "voluntary" act, or an optional behavior. We are not automatons compelled to engage in war, even if sometimes it seems so. To the extent that warring behavior is part of human nature, that is something to be explained, not left unexamined.

War Dances

There is not just one thing called "war;" the term covers many different activities at different scales. Despite that, in every case, war has always been a social activity, predominantly done by males.

Historically, war has almost always been a male activity. In thinking about what males do, one must consider the males of many non-human species. From fish to people, contests between males are in the first place about mating (reproduction), and derivatively about territory and food. It seems to me, early in the evolution of animals, males figured out that having control of territory and food improves chances of controlling females. Later on, males figured out that being the alpha male improved the odds of reproduction hugely. Thus, the typical struggle among males to be dominant and control the best territories. War is the logical extension of this Darwinian behavior.

The scale of war varies from the street gang to the international, planetary rumble. Usually wars involve a lot more than 2 people, as a match between 2 contestants is usually just a fight. If, however, the 2 contestants are the last standing representatives of slain armies, or representatives of larger groups, they may be fighting a war. In any event, it is not clear what we would call a war at the low end of the scale. As the number of participants increases, the activity is more certainly a war. For example, there are "gang wars" between various groups of teenagers, usually involving a dozen or more members on each side. It is fairly common to call violence between organized groups involving more than a handful of people "war." Almost everyone agrees that violence between armies is war, where "army" refers to groups recruited and organized by a society for the specific purpose of fighting other societies.

Wars are violent activities. The essence of war is conflict, not agreement and co-operation. War is trial by strength or wits or other methods, in which one side wins and everyone else loses. Wars are not just about winners, but importantly about losers, as is demonstrated in the ultimate war: Doomsday or Armageddon. While each combatant hopes for victory over all opponents, and also hopes to gain by that victory, combatants hope even more for their opponents' loss. In playing the world war game during the last 60 years, all sides have adopted Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the best strategy. The premise of such a strategy is that we win when you lose, even if no one is left standing to appreciate the result.

The Bush Administration's preference for a unilateral, first-strike policy is expressed in its National Security Strategy (NSS, September, 2002). NSS states the goal of American policy is dominance over the rest of the world. The underlying principle of the NSS is simply 'might makes right,' although some words about the righteousness of the American way are added to justify the use of might. The NSS' neo-conservative authors explicitly reject MAD, because they want to win and live to enjoy it. This document is not about losers, but about prospective winners.

The NSS' authors assume the United States will survive any war contemplated by the government. Some of these authors served in the Reagan Administration, during which they advocated the "survivalist" line, that enough of the United States would be left after an all-out nuclear war to claim victory. The NSS authors assume the United States will "win" any nuclear exchange. Of course, these are untested prospective statements. No one knows what would actually happen in a real nuclear war, or other scenarios suggested by the NSS document.

Wars, then, are conflicts between people. They are organized, social activities. There are always at least two sides; combatants are grouped. They may be fought for some purpose which the combatants hold in common. Very often, the sides are mirror images which cannot be separated.

The causes of wars are usually not rational. Once started, wars are always fought for personal and group survival. They represent a trial by fire, a grand reversion to the law of the jungle. The underlying motive for having a war is the perception of the combatants that 'this town is not big enough for the two us;' i.e., wars are a zero sum game.

Inseparable Partners

The proponents of war invariably suggest their side will be better off for the exercise, and seldom take into account the possibility of losing. War is said to be about winning, because the combatants are urged to win it, and the speaker assumes his side will win. These prospective statements are not revealing of the nature of war, but only of the reasons and feelings one might have in favor of it.

Proponents of war almost invariably state their case in terms of the goals to be achieved, the rewards of victory. We are told war is necessary to defend ourselves, to gain our freedom and/or the freedom of allies, to obtain riches, territory or Empire, or even to remove obnoxious elements (people) from our midst. Americans made war on the Indians, and the Nazis on the Jews, because those alien peoples supposedly (actively or passively) prevented the majority race from gaining their 'place under the sun.' Proponents do not consider losing the war a serious possibility, and do not dwell on that prospect. (Again, most often wars are not prosecuted when there is a serious risk of losing.) Certainly, most literate people are aware of the most famous, recent example of ginning up a war: the Bush Administration's systematic attack on Iraq starting September, 2002.

So, in advance of war, the emphasis is more on winners and winning than losing and losers. This is intended to overcome fear, the natural reluctance to undertake very risky tasks. It is also intended to intimidate the potential enemy. That emphasis disguises the consequences of losing, which are implicit in war: there will be a winner and a loser.

Everyone fears losing a war, often to the point of discrediting that possibility. Losers pay many penalties, including death, disease, disability, poverty, slavery and torture. When it becomes plain that a war is or will be lost, rational people sue for peace. At that point, further pursuit of war becomes a strategy for making the eventual peace more favorable to the losers. When no hope of winning exists, the war becomes a defense against things getting worse, because the losers may have value to the extent they can impose damage on the victors. Unless the victors are ruthless and entirely without mercy, it may pay to offer surrender and attempt to negotiate the terms. Most people feel unconditional and abject surrender is to be avoided at all costs, short of death.

Participants in war know the stakes, they know what it will mean to lose. No rational person, and even most irrational ones, will go to war if there is little prospect of winning. But, I concede there are some rational people who will fight a war despite the prospect of losing. For example, Admiral Yamamoto prepared the plan and commanded the attack on Pearl Harbor, as ordered by the Emperor's Cabinet, but also remarked that Japan would be "awakening a sleeping giant." He felt the attack on Pearl Harbor was a long shot, but he also felt he must do his duty. In cases such as this, education and training - culture - can lead normally rational people into making irrational decisions. I think there is always an irrational element in going to war ("throwing the dice"), unless victory is nearly certain or the combatants are insane. (Insanity is an excuse, because responsibility cannot be assigned.)

Some combatants try to guarantee there cannot be victory or defeat. Islamic suicide bombers, for example, are said to believe they will be rewarded in their heaven, so they cannot be defeated. Martyrs generally try to turn defeat into victory by making themselves noteworthy examples. Hitler tried to make Germany commit national suicide, and then killed himself, rather than accept defeat. There are many more examples in recent history of the extent to which death is preferable to defeat, even the idea of defeat. Such extreme cases illustrate the denial of reality in an illusion that victory exists without defeat.
 

The victors try to preserve their exalted state in statuary and other historical memorabilia, so their accomplishment can never be derided. Tyrants try to erase any memory of defeated martyrs, but suffer from the contradiction that rewriting history to eliminate losers also erases the winners. In history, the losers always have the advantage that they cannot be forgotten.

Victors often find their glory "hollow," for as soon as the defeated have been dispatched there is no reference for the winners' exalted state. Veterans often long for the "good old days" when they were at war, as opposed to these lesser, latter days when they have been reduced to ordinary men. The liquidation of the defeated often brings about the demoralization of the victors. Thus, victory seems more substantial in advance of war than when it is done and over.

War sets up a necessary connection between winning and losing; there is no 'one hand clapping.' Emotional and other needs of the victors are met by preying on the defeated. Warriors have need to feel unbeatable and justified, so their enemies are always described as less than human or inhuman or crazed automatons. All of that propaganda is intended to disguise the need for a human victim, that most dangerous enemy. In the ultimate triumph, only the spirit of the winners survives, somehow made larger and more glorious by the victory. What is often not noticed is that the glory only exists in comparison to the debasement of the victims. Victory does not exist by itself.