Unfinished Business: War 6

Wars may also be unjustified, based on legal or other considerations. For example, it may be unjustified if it was founded on false excuses or pretexts, or if it occurred in violation of International agreements and conventions.

But, I haven't yet found any way of supporting those opposing a war in the manner of refusal or disobedience, or even approving those who oppose a war by legal means. This is a very strange fact about war: that it is difficult to stop it once it starts, no matter how unjust, illegal or immoral. It doesn't matter whether one is engaged in fighting the war, or is a non-combatant, or an uninvolved far-off bystander: wars just grind on until there is a winner and a loser, no matter what. Blood lust takes over; everyone is reduced to a beast of the jungle.

Just War

Traditionally, a distinction is made between so-called "just wars" and other, presumably "unjust" wars. Most people believe fighting the Nazis was just, and that the Nazi aggression against other European countries was unjust. These positions are symmetrical, which is to say that one side waged a just war and the other did not.

There is a retrospective difficulty in the concept of just war: the victors almost always will be seen as just, because they write the history. Nonetheless, the American Nazi party still touts Adolph Hitler's goals of eliminating "world Jewry" and defending the West against Bolshevism. For Nazis and some conservative sympathizers, Hitler fought a just war. In promoting that view, latter day Nazis have a long, twilight struggle against the victors, who have defined "just" in a way that makes Nazism de jure unjust.

Is there some way of disentangling the winners and losers from prevalent notions of "just war?" In other words, is justice a concept that rises above, or goes beyond, who won? To ask this question, and suppose an affirmative answer exists, is to deny that 'might makes right.'

One of the interesting contradictions in this subject arises from World War II. If the war against the Nazis was just, the Nazis must have fought an unjust war. But, were the Nazis entitled to defend themselves when the war turned against them? That is, does an unjust person or a villain have the right of self-defense?

Ordinarily, it is considered that victims of aggression have the right to fight off their attackers. But, the use of force to stop aggression is limited in ordinary criminal cases to just that amount required to stop the aggression. The ordinary citizen is not empowered to deliver on-the-spot retribution or punishment for aggressive crime; that must await trial and judgement in an authorized Court. Using this guideline, were the Allies justified in pursuing the Nazis all the way to Berlin? Was the use of the A-bomb part of a "reasonable defense" against the Japanese?
 

At least in my mind, it is not so clear what is or isn't just, because such a judgement depends on local culture and personal experience. Of course, perhaps my reasoning is circular, since I am a convinced "cultural relativist;" a notion I believe based on the facts of human experience.

In the mind of white racists, non-white people do not suffer as much as "people" (that is, white people) because they are more like animals. The racist treatment of the inferior races reinforces supremacist beliefs, because the oppressed people will behave as their oppressors expect to avoid further punishment. Thus, apartheid in America and elsewhere is self-perpetuating; another vicious circle. For a lot of "reasons," I detest racists, but it does appear their views are "rational," given their upbringing and social conditions. How do I justify fighting apartheid?

Is there any way to cut the Gordian knot? There must be some basis to say some things are right, others wrong. That basis solves the problem of justice, making some claims true and others false.

Moral Evolution

None of this would be a problem, if we were unintelligent or even intelligent automatons. I imagine ants do not have a moral sense. What ants do is neither right nor wrong, but only what they do. Most likely, computers are similar to ants: amoral creatures all. Amoral creatures cannot be tried and punished for their acts, because their is no intentionality, no consideration and judgement. We don't like it when some parasite attacks and kills humans, but we cannot blame them; we cannot hold them morally responsible. But, we do hold humans responsible for cruel or unnecessary killing of other, amoral creatures. So, ethical principles only apply to creatures sufficiently intelligent to consider alternative actions, and which have the demonstrated capacity to do more than one thing in given situations; i.e., they are not pre-programmed.

The most important hypothesis that arises from the ideas of evolution and programming is that we must have risen from simpler things. Programming, implemented as DNA, is what allows evolution. If morally competent humans evolved from lesser species that were not morally competent, there must be a route from the one state to the other. It is this same observation that motivates work on Artificial Intelligence (AI), because building an intelligent computer is only reinventing what Nature has already wrought.

In earlier times, the major lines of argument were drawn around static ideas. Something was good or bad, right or wrong. Even relativism before modern times assumed there were persistent models and references, with respect to which things were relative. What evolution introduces into the argument is dynamism, dynamic change. The difference may be illustrated by the different "feel" of Newton's Universe, Einstein's Universe and a Big Bang, evolving Universe. Newton's world is based on static, universal laws. The entire Newtonian Universe could be thought of as a large box containing a huge number of mechanically linked parts, a clockwork. Each part of the clockwork moves from one "predestined" event to the next. It used to be boasted that the entire past and future of the Universe could be calculated given a starting point and Newton's mechanics. Einstein changed that concept by making the calculation more complex, since everything within the Universe affects everything else. The extent of Einstein's Universe is not static, as it grows or shrinks in space and time. Einstein's Universe is not a clockwork, but it is continuous, not quantized or random. In recent times, our Universes start with the Big Bang, an origin consistent with Einstein's General Relativity. However, we have learned that the internals of our Universe evolve, and maybe the whole thing evolves. In an evolving Big Bang Universe, the beginning doesn't necessarily look like the end. Worse still, the introduction of Quantum Mechanical notions into our Universe deprives us of any certain knowledge of where we've been and where we're going. The Big Bang Universe evolves, and the parts don't necessarily stick together. These are very different cosmologies.

Earlier, I introduced the concept of "moral evaporation," which results from moral evolution. The specifics of ethics, moral judgements, evolve along with everything else. I think it unreasonable to expect a Roman landlord to have treated his slaves any better than ante bellum Southern plantation owners. The moral judgement that slavery is wrong is a modern development, which started to form about a century before it was confirmed by the results of the American Civil War. Slavery, especially sex slavery, still exists in the modern world, but it is universally condemned. Slave owners and traders are criminals subject to prosecution almost everywhere.

It was not like that in the Ancient World, where slavery was the usual condition for large numbers of people. There were no criminal codes forbidding it. The ancient morality considered slavery a misfortune, something to be avoided at all costs, but not immoral. Slaves were considered to have a duty to their masters, to owe their lives to their masters. People might look askance at a cruel master, but bad treatment of slaves was not in itself a disqualifying characteristic for purposes of social recognition and standing. Masters were thought to be entitled to extract such services from slaves as they demanded, even to the death. Thus, Roman gladiators were almost always slaves, who could be ordered to fight to the death for the pleasure of the master.

Things have advanced greatly since the days of ancient Rome and the Chin dynasty. The moral rules by which people made judgements in those times have evaporated; in a famous Nixon-era phrase, they are no longer operative. While we might consider that an advance, such a notion depends on a further belief in "progress." While I think modern judgements about slavery better (for a reason) than those of ancient times, or even 150 years ago, it is minimally accurate and less prejudicial to consider only that morality has evolved. "Evolution" does not specify 'forward' or back,' and does not imply any moral or aesthetic value at all. It is just change, the change that survives.

So, moral codes and judgements must be examined using historical criteria. They reflect the mores of the time. They are imbedded in a certain "rationality;" i.e., the world view of an era. By and large it is not possible to generalize from historical conditions to all times. It is noteworthy that, despite these cautions, some ethical and moral notions have persisted since the beginnings of civilization. Some of these appear to have an evolutionary history, analogous to the evolution of related species. My view is the ones that lasted have something to do with our "nature" as an intelligent species, and, by implication, probably apply to any intelligent species.

If there is another intelligent, technical species in our Universe, it is probably similar to ourselves in certain, critical ways that have to do with ethical behavior. It is unlikely that a species of saints evolved initially, even if sainthood becomes a preoccupation at a later stage. If Darwinian evolution took place on that other world, individuals probably had to struggle to survive. There is no species' "will to live," because "species" does not exist in the flesh, only individuals do. ["Species" is a concept, a class of mating creatures, not a being.) So, wherever a struggle for survival occurred, the law of the jungle ('might makes right') must have prevailed. Those with the best abilities to survive did so; hence, I would expect most members of that species to be pretty rugged individuals. I don't think the survivors would willingly sacrifice themselves, or feel that being killed is meaningless. Thus, I think a prohibition on murder is likely to be universal, because nature produces individuals who resist death, who don't want others to kill them. There is a natural way in which the "moral law" forbidding murder could have developed from the primal struggle for existence.

It may be argued that there is ample evidence of altruism in many species. Those examples usually have to do with mating, reproduction and raising of offspring. I cannot think of examples in which a relative "voluntarily" dies for the benefit of relatives, tribe or species (a gene group). The killing of the male praying mantis prior to mating is not a counter-example, as it does not seem the male "volunteers." In such cases, the male is congenitally stupid or programmed, and cannot resist what turns out to be a lethal situation. Recent work has also shown the male cannot ejaculate sperm to fertilize the female until its head is removed. In any event, the altruism shown in other species does not have moral content because, as far as we know, there was no weighing of alternatives and choice.

We need to ask whether altruism in humans is customary and usual? My answer is 'no,' even if some religions point to thousands of martyrs who willingly died for the cause. Consider, for example, those who volunteer for military service. They are told being a soldier is dangerous, and there is a probability of getting killed in battle. Now suppose we had some way of knowing by a special mark who would be killed in battle, and who not. Further suppose that people having the mark know what it portends, and also know that they will not die prematurely if they do not go into battle. My question is, what would happen to the Army under these circumstances?

I don't have an exact answer to the question, but believe Army enlistments would be drastically reduced. I doubt enlistees think about dying for their country as if it were a certainty. They are trained to fight. They are trained to follow orders. They are told they will have the best chance of surviving combat if they learn how to fight well and follow orders. They are told that, these days, far less than 10% of those in combat will be injured or die. Therefore, soldiers going into battle have reason to believe they will inflict damage on the enemy, but are unlikely to suffer injury themselves. Since combat injury or death is random, and lately a very low rate, these beliefs will be reinforced in battle, even if some nearby soldiers are casualties. In other words, I think those who go into combat do so because they believe they will survive and win, not be sacrificed.

There was widespread resistance to the draft during the Vietnam war, precisely because it was felt that being sent there was either a death warrant or the start of personal ruin. Having witnessed that debacle, I believe most people do not volunteer for military service for altruistic reasons. I doubt they are willing to sacrifice themselves; rather, I think people enlist for selfish reasons, and assure themselves they will not end up in front line combat. (In fact, over 80% of today's Army fight wars while sitting in computerized cubicles thousands of miles from the front lines.)

Another problem for volunteers is the gung-ho, self-sacrificing type. Willingness to die can threaten a unit, as it may reduce the determination to fight. Gen Patton used to say a soldier's purpose is to make the other guy die for his country. Altruism can be counter-productive.

Religious martyrs cannot be said to die willingly. In most cases, they have had little choice in the matter; they were slaughtered. In the recent cases of Islamic suicide bombers, these religious people are convinced they will not die, but will enter heaven. They believe they will be eternally rewarded by their gods for their acts. So, the Islamic religious martyr is very much like our American military volunteers who do not expect to die in battle. Many early Christian martyrs had similar beliefs and expectations. The fact that I may think martyrs seriously deluded or brainwashed, and have absolutely no evidence of their eternal reward, is not an argument for their willingness to die for others. The martyr's altruism is limited to believing in salvation by a god, which amounts to denial of their eventual death.

The likely conclusion is that extra-terrestrial aliens are probably just as willing to die, and as eager to live, as any of us. This means self-preservation, and all that implies, is probably high on everyone's list of desirable goods. With respect to our subject, war, it implies people and aliens are unlikely to get into one they believe they will lose. (This may justify a policy of arming to deter attack.)

Ethics Starts With ...

There are several claims I would like to make, which are illustrated or suggested by the foregoing discussion about evolution, history, aliens, altruism, and the military:

Of all the things I have considered, the only one of which I can be certain is the claim of moral agency: I claim it for myself. However evolution did it, I and those presumed like me arrived, somehow, making morality possible.

Moral Agents

I think the way out of my dilemma about War necessarily starts with the idea of the moral agent, who is worthy of respect. This is a status we evolve into, not something we are "born with."

If there can be any right or wrong about War, it has to start with the judgements moral agents make. These judgements must be personal, based on each agent's claim to moral knowledge. There is no point second guessing what an agent says is right, wrong, good or bad because that is simply what they say. The judgement will only have meaning if the agent goes on to specify just why it was made, or what it means. Only then can there be an argument.

In authoritarian societies, there is a designated moral agent (or entity) who makes the choice. The assumption is that no one else is capable of being a moral agent. Of course, that denies my claim that moral agency is self-proclaimed, so could be conferred on anyone capable of making the claim. [I admit, a somewhat circular argument, because making the claim proves capability. I do not think it viciously circular; rather, it is a Turing test.] For this reason, I think my views are inconsistent with any authoritarian model of society.

While it is possible that authoritarianism is good for people, and maybe it is right, too, I think that very unlikely. Historical records are filled with stories of authoritarian societies, none of which satisfied most of the people. Our modern experience is that authoritarians inhibit science, art and progress generally, as a result of oppressing people. It doesn't matter what kind of authority is in charge: priests, monarchs, generals, politicians, and revolutionary heroes make life miserable for most people. What we learned in the 20^th century follows the late 19^th century saying: 'power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.'

In fact, it is the dismal history of tyranny in modern times that leads me to reject a social basis for morality. I believe modern tyrannies, starting with the Spanish Inquisition, are far worse than any ancient ones. Ancient Kings and Pharaohs went to war, enslaved or murdered entire peoples, and treated their subjects as draft animals. Fortunately, their powers were limited by their short lives and poor technology, so they could not, and did not, do damage on a modern scale. All that changed progressively after the Renaissance, ending recently with the invention of the H-Bomb, genetic warfare and other genocidal weapons only madmen would use. (Or, at least, it is common to believe anyone who would use those weapons must be mad.) But, as those who lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis learned, even "rational" men would push the button; you had to be irrational not to start the war. Almost any abomination can be declared sane and right 'in the name of the people.' If one believes ethics is rooted in society, that it is a property of human aggregations, not individuals, then one has no choice but to submit to the wisdom of our leaders, even when the approved policy is MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction).

While limited democracy was invented in ancient Athens, democracy is mostly a modern practice and norm. Democratic societies are a vast improvement on tyranny, judging by their better standards of living and peoples' preferences. In democratic societies, there is no "rational" way to prefer one person's opinion over any other; hence, voting and polls. What is actually done will be the result of many judgements representing the preponderance of opinion. But, democracy does not always work; it can be as immoral and troubling as tyranny when it becomes the tyranny of the mob. So, there are fine lines that cannot be crossed in a democracy: authority is needed to restrain "the mob" but cannot become entrenched.

On account of that historical background, I prefer to make ethics and morals inherent in the individual. The Cartesian style claim of moral agency makes sense to me, because I can make it. I can assume others capable of making such a claim, too, because I am acquainted with them. They seem to have the essential qualities requisite for moral agency; they are like me in that respect. I do not know what, exactly, those qualities are, but I recognize them when I see them.

The first general principle of Ethics arises because there are others like me, and I cannot deny them whatever I would allow myself. That first principle is that all moral agents are equal; that, in respect of moral judgement, there are no significant differences between them. It matters not whether an agent is discovered in 'the state of nature' or in Parliament, they are all ab initio equivalent. This equality arises because the "internals" of moral agents cannot be examined a priori; they are "black boxes." We have no rule of discrimination by which one black box can be treated differently from any other; they are unmarked. If we were soldiers walking through a field, and the black boxes were land mines, we would have no reason whatsoever to consider any of them better or worse, more or less dangerous, just because our lives depend on making the correct judgement about them.

Some will object that an ethic arising from individuals, especially a self-proclaimed morality, can be used to justify a Hitler or Stalin or anything at all. The claim is my version of ethics is completely arbitrary.

The first retort to such a claim is that a socially-based ethics can be guilty of the same sins. Utopian philosophies, for example, quickly turn into dictatorships, starting with Plato's Philosopher-King. That no tyrant has long succeeded without the use of force shows that even benevolent Philosopher-Kings will have a difficult time generating the Good Society. One of the Star Trek episodes illustrates a soulless society, perfected by Landru, which turns out to be a computer. Landru's society is orderly and satiated, because of the incredible mind control it exercises over people. On the other hand, the people have to be allowed a period of lawless craziness every so often to relieve their tensions. There are many science fiction works which depict errant societies based on "universal goods;:" e.g., 1984, Brave New World, and Animal Farm. What sort of ethics evolves depend critically not just on the source of authority, but on subtle constraints which apply on that source.

Second, Hitler, Stalin and the like do not have a free hand in my view, because they have no more moral authority than anyone else. Such tyrants must refuse to recognize anyone else as a moral agent, in order to justify their power. If, indeed, the tyrant is the only moral agent, then whatever is done may be justified: I grant the criticism in this case. The difficulty arises in a world peopled by many others like the tyrant, at least one of whom also claims moral agency. In this case, unless the other moral agents totally agree with the dictator, it is not clear what status the whims of one have when disallowed by others. The dictator can force the others to obey, but that use of force denies their moral agency; i.e., it does not respect others.

It seems reasonably obvious to me that the equality of moral agents implies that no one agent may impose judgement on others. If, however, it is not implicit, then I specify a second general principle of ethics, that moral agents must be treated as 'ends in themselves' and not solely as a means. I lift this Kantian idea from the master's works, and plunk it down squarely in the underpinning of my ethical theory. In doing so, I don't plan to insert ad hoc premises to meet criticisms. I think ethics can be founded on a few claims - premises - from which everything else follows.

At this point, having founded a population of moral agents, I can refer them to the contract theorists, such as Locke, Rousseau, Kant and, in our day, John Rawls, to determine what sort of society they will make. I do differ from those theorists in one crucial matter:

A moral agent has the right of refusal, of non-compliance, with the social contract, provided society may withdraw its benefits, or punish dissidents, within limits set by the second principle. I take this as a third principle.

This third principle is necessary to deal with crime. Civil disobedience, even if done by saints having pure motives, is illegal. Despite that, a just society will make some provision for distinguishing "hard" criminals from those attempting to correct an injustice. Of course, even in America, this is not done.

A close corollary of these principles is a simplified, restatement of Kant's Categorical Imperative:

In judging whether something is right, the judgement must be applicable to any moral agent in the same or similar circumstances.

This ethical principle, or something like Kant's statement of it, could be an alternative third principle, as I think my third principle is derivable from it and the other principles. Whichever way it is done, all of these principles are closely associated. The Categorical Imperative proposes a test for the validity of moral judgements, and other ethical principles as well: judgements must allow of generalization. (Kant wants to make judgements "universal," to comply with his idealism, but it is sufficient for materialists such as myself that I can generalize upon instances.) If the judgement is quite specific, and only applies to oneself, it is hard to see how it falls in the realm of "moral" judgements. It is only when our judgements are applied to others that questions of right arise.

Because my interpretation of Kant's Categorical Imperative may not be all that Kant, in his Idealism, would desire, I will call it the Rule of Generalization (abbrev: Generalization, Rule G, or RG). A truncated version of Generalization is the everyday Golden Rule: 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

In consequence of the first principle, moral judgements must treat all moral agents equally, whereas Generalization is delimited by 'similar circumstances.' The resolution of seeming conflict is simply that all moral agents are treated equally, when the judgement applies. Those not covered by the judgement need not worry about it, because a right judgement will not treat anyone as a means only. Further, if the judgement is defective, the third principle condones protest and refusal to comply.

Kant's test is useful, because there may be very few moral judgements which apply to all moral agents, even if ethical principles themselves must be universal (not merely general). Moral judgements - Kant's "practical reason" - apply to real world situations, so are always specific. That specificity causes another, long debated problem: what are similar circumstances? I admit that this question, and the related 'What is a Fact?' have long plagued me, but, in the end, my answer is to avoid making the perfect the enemy of the good. "Similar circumstances" need not be a perfect, all-seeing consideration of every possible case. It is sufficient to cast a net fine enough to catch the intended prey. Moreover, it helps the explication of moral behavior, that making judgements constrained by "similar circumstances" is just what people do.

'Similar circumstances' becomes cases and precedents in our system of law, and in some schools of business management. Because we do not know the future, it is impossible to determine all of the consequences of our decisions. At the time of decision, we can only account for what is foreseeable. (We do have a duty to use the best available knowledge in determining the foreseeable.) For that reason, it is usual to excuse those who made judgements which are found to be erroneous or harmful at a later time; we don't blame people who make "honest" mistakes. This process of reduced moral responsibility is part of what I termed "moral evaporation."

On the other hand, moral evaporation does not excuse those who intended evil things, or those who are negligent or feckless in carrying out their responsibilities. A moral agent is bound to make a good faith effort to determine what effects a moral judgement will have. Initially, the proposed effects - good and bad - are all part of the "similar circumstances" associated with that judgement. However, that initial listing is subject to change and correction as the subsequent actualities are determined. It is my view that "similar circumstances" is a process of prediction, testing, recording and refinement. My view takes account of the famous saying, 'the devil is in the details,' which corresponds to a widespread belief in Murphy's Law ('if something can go wrong, it will'). To those, I add my "Ninja Principle:" you will be attacked where you least expect it. Things not going exactly right, or as predicted, is an important facet of human existence, depicted in comedies, tragedies and the news every day. The qualification, "similar circumstances," recognizes that condition, and recommends that one start with best estimates and improve the estimates with experience. I think the experimental - refinement - approach lays to rest most of the objections to Generalization, if not Kant's Categorical Imperative. Moral agents don't have to be perfect; we can allow their judgements to be inexact.

It is the combination of these three principles, and the Rule of Generalization, which, in my opinion, allows dissent from prosecution of a war. Those who dissent will not have an easy time of it, as indicated by the third principle, but they do have the right of dissent and to refuse compliance. This is the moral basis for evaluating war I was seeking. This makes it possible to consider the justice of some recent wars.