At a Distance

Why Bother?

I am in the middle of Dennett's Freedom Evolves, which (as I said before) I will review later. His book is about materialism and the classical problem of Free Will. Dennett seeks to establish that free will is not only possible, but meaningful, in the natural world, even in a deterministic world. I think one of the main arguments to his end is that what is 'free' or 'determined' depends on the level of analysis. At least, this sort of argument is implicit in much that I have written for years. (That doesn't mean I invented it; it only means it is an old argument.)

It seems to me "morality" is something proper to the participants¹. When I step on an ant, which happens inadvertently and almost unavoidably most of the time on the way to my mailbox, I don't have great moral qualms about it. It could be that I have upset the world order, as in 'the butterfly's beating its wings in China causes a hurricane in Cuba,' but I don't know whether that's true. Even if it is true, I doubt I can be held responsible, as I have no a priori way of determining whether it is true. Moral responsibility is limited to the choices at hand. For this reason, we don't blame robots and machines that go wacko (they don't make choices) even when they injure humans who we value. On the other hand, were I an ant, I might be blamed for having stepped on other ants. That is because, in that case, I would be a participant in the society of ants, capable of helping or hurting ant purposes.

If an ET orbits our planet, does the annihilation of one human group or another make any difference to it? Suppose, for example, the ET's remote sensing capabilities detect an approaching comet, and determine a likely impact on Earth. Let us suppose this is not a major catastrophic event, but only ruins some cities such as Los Angeles or Tokyo or Calcutta². What is ET's duty toward the humans and other life forms soon to be terminated? What about the famous "Star Trek" invocation of the Federation's non-involvement principle: outsiders should not intervene in the workings of other societies and the natural order on other planets. Laissez faire is not only a popular doctrine in economics, but science fiction, too.

Now, I think it reasonable to say that no problem exists if the ants suddenly rise up, and ask me not to step on them. Or, if some giant Big Brother Ant - the Ant Cop - arrived on the scene to direct traffic and prevent mayhem. In the same fashion, I don't think there is a problem if Earth's occupants ask ET to help them out. In each case, I believe a reasonable moral agent is compelled to honor the request or direction, because it is the request of an equal, another moral agent. That is especially true if it costs me or ET little or nothing to abide by those requests which we would most likely make ourselves in similar circumstances. So, this is an easy outcome: it's nearly free to do the right thing, to assist another moral being in achieving its ends.

But, what if no Ant Cop arrives, and ET hears no plea for salvation? In these cases, the potential savior knows things inaccessible to future victims. The ants don't know they will be stepped on, and Earthlings don't know they will be crushed. If they do know it, it matters not, because they have no means of communicating their knowledge to places and beings that matter. The victims believe they are stuck with their fate, or they have no beliefs about it at all.

The situation is the same, in the slightly different case, when those about to be abused have some inkling of a fate they fear, and wish to avoid it. But, they pray to the wrong gods, or appeal to powers that cannot or do not hear them, or they attempt to placate and appease those powers in the wrong way. For example, there are the movies in which savages try to placate the volcano, usually by offering up a nubile virgin (young female). The victims believe they will suffer their fate, unless higher powers intervene.

Now, it may be thought that a knowledgeable ET should respond to this last situation as if the victims had applied for help. In this case, we can be sympathetic with the victims' fears, especially if they do not seem unreasonable. (We might have the same feelings if we were in that fix.) The victims are appealing for help, and might even apply to ET if they knew it existed. But, they do not know of ET's existence. If ET does help them, it would reveal its existence. Helping them would make ET like Superman, the alien committed to helping victims (assuming it can). When ET does help, it is clearly the result of choice, as with Superman; i.e., ET chooses to be involved with the victims. That choice makes ET a participant in the victim's society, hence liable for whatever it does under their rules.

Those of us who want and need a Superman or ET might welcome the intervention, but what of the non-intervention guidelines? Here we have two questions: (1) is ET required by any ethical principle to intervene (as if requested) if ET doesn't happen to favor the victims, and (2) is there any ethical principle which prevents intervention, even if ET loves the victims. In other words, can the intervention be optional, and does a desire to participate in society overcome laws (even principles) that forbid it?

Before proceeding with this series of questions, let's go back to the previous case, in which ET receives no pleas from victims who are unaware of their fate or ET. This can be treated as an special instance of part (2) above, the case in which ET cares about the victims, or of part (1) when ET cares not about the victims. In other words, it doesn't matter whether ET cares about the victims. It doesn't matter whether the victims are able to contact ET. What does matter is whether ET is aware of the plight of the victims, and could do something about it.

Digression: If our ET is aware of the victims' plight, and wants to help them, but cannot do anything about it, I think it matters not. My view follows the old saying, 'the road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions.' Making the right decision assumes the capability of carrying it out; i.e., of doing what is right. Here we have a distinction between 'good' and 'right,' because 'good' does not necessarily require the completion of intention; i.e., 'good;' is a more subjective term. Some philosophers have called 'good' a quality, probably because it can have this sort of nebulous application. I prefer to use terms which are quite concrete. 'Good' can be tied down, in such uses as 'good for,' but it is very common to apply it in statements like, 'ET is a good alien because it cares ...' Those uses make the term hopelessly confusing. (Would Oxford list "good₁," "good₂" ..., and would anyone pay attention?) In any event, I can agree that ET is a good alien, because it would like to help, while also asserting that it doesn't matter because it cannot. Again, in the contrary form, inability is a legitimate exemption from ethical requirements, whereas it may not affect goodness.

In Range

Now, why should a disinterested ET, who has not been asked, save the potential victims? I note this is like asking whether I should watch my step on the way to the mailbox.

It might be done amorally. For example, I might brush away a humming bird from a plant I poisoned with pesticide, just because I like hummingbirds. I don't have to appreciate this humming bird, or believe anything special about the moral nature of hummingbirds. Maybe it is their mode of flight that fascinates me, or their quick movements, or the seeming impossibility of staying aloft on nectar. Whatever it is, I encourage hummingbirds, while I attack and drive away crows and blue jays. I don't think I am intervening grossly into nature. Whatever I do is unlikely to upset any evolutionary tendencies, or change the balances built into the natural world around me. So, it doesn't matter.

None of that involves any moral decision. I don't have any interest in the society of hummingbirds, crows or jays, and they haven't done a thing about enrolling me in theirs. I have no idea whether those birds are sentient beings in a similar manner to myself. They haven't made any claim on my moral sensibilities. I don't know of any rule that prevents me from shooing away blue jays, or feeding the hummingbirds in my patio. Now, if those birds were among the last few remaining of their species, or if a nexus between my treatment of them and globally important conditions were made, it could be different. Then, I might have a moral obligation to do this or that. But, my example precludes all of those additional problems. It doesn't matter whether I continue doing what I am doing in my patio, or do nothing. Acts with a sufficiently small scope are morally indifferent; they fall through the ethical net.

Now, maybe I can excuse myself from walking carefully on that score: a couple of thousand ants just doesn't matter on the grand scale of things. If so, then our ET can excuse itself from doing anything about, say, a meteor that wipes out an African village: too few people, too far away; so what? On the grander scale of things, that would indeed be a correct calculation. The fact is even the killing of 25 million Russians in WWII didn't slow down the human species. It didn't even change the Russian regime. It may have even hastened the post-war Russian economic build-up. So, in the large, it is hard to see the immorality of not intervening in Rwanda, or now the Sudan. Which brings us to an antithetical conclusion: it is exactly the particular acts that count. So, I would have to account for each and every one of those ants I squashed in my masochist rush to receive my bills. (Trial for particulars is the way our laws work.)

The Federation's non-intervention principle is one of those ethical ideas which works on and from the grand scale. 'Don't intervene in planetary evolution' requires an "outside" view of the planet, and some understanding of that evolution over long periods of time. One would have to know whether squashing ants in Davis, California will bring about a change that would not otherwise have happened. Now, perhaps there is a fallacy in such a non-intervention principle, even for a disconnected ET in Earth orbit. This principle supposes our outsider can determine the workings of the machine - evolution in this case - sufficiently to fix causes and effects. In fact, the outsider would have to know the workings with great precision, because it would have to be determined what are the outcomes in two "possible" worlds: the one with ants and the one in which they are squashed. I admit this sort of problem is beyond me, and, I suspect, beyond any ET I can conjure up as well.

So, I think we have to throw out the non-intervention principle because it assumes moral agents are god-like in their knowledge of circumstances. The required scale is just too grand. This leaves an uncaring ET in an even greater quandary than before, because inaction is not justified by a non-intervention principle. On the other hand, the barrier against acting, in case ET cares about the victims to be saved, is somewhat removed. That barrier is not totally removed, because ET might be held responsible for a bad outcome in case he misjudged the situation. Mainly, throwing out the Federation's non-intervention principle means moral agents have to think carefully about their judgements, for they will be held accountable.

What seems to be the case is that moral judgements are proximate, and of a reasonable scale. That is, they do not arise from grand schemes and they don't apply to insignificant matters. There is a criterion of significance which fixes what may come into view. Moral actions - the carrying out of judgements - have an effective range, which is, again, neither too far away nor too close. This in-between-ness is one of the things which makes morality fuzzy, and causes all the arguments. Somehow, things seem much clearer when viewed through a microscope or telescope, not through one's own eyes.

Compelling Knowledge?

One would think an ET would have a clear view of whether to save the future victims, orbiting as it does far above Earth, disconnected from, and unconcerned about, human affairs (except as an objective observer). ET could look upon the lives and deaths of Earthlings in the same way I perceive ants. In that event, saving them might be done amorally. But, Earthlings are not ants; they qualify as moral agents, in the same class as ET.

We've thrown out non-intervention, because it is too general and requires knowledge not even ET has. But, is there some principle that requires intervention? Here, we are considering the case in which ET knows intervention could save lives, but has not been asked to do it. This is a different scenario than the case in which ET is asked to intervene, or has a social duty to do so based on past involvements (promises, decisions). Is there some moral compulsion built into mere knowledge that has moral consequences ?

This is certainly a disputed question. For example, those who built the original nuclear weapons knew what those bombs could do. It has been argued that nuclear weapons knowledge imposed on the builders a special duty to prevent their use. The opposing argument is that the effects of nuclear weapons are the responsibility of those who use them. This argument is similar to the oft repeated NRA (National Rifle Assoc) saying, that guns do not kill, people do. Do things have an ethical nature? Or, does knowledge of those things carry an ethical burden? Or, is ethics (moral judgements) an entirely different matter?

The answer to this question makes all the difference to ET. For, if there is something inherently right in saving people from disasters, it would seem ET must do what it can to that end. That ET foresees the disaster is a sufficient condition for action. That what is foreseen is a disaster is a necessary condition for action. Another necessary condition is that saving moral agents from death or injury matters (whereas ants don't count). In this formulation, there are several derivative questions as well; e.g., what is quality (certainty) of ET's foresight? I will avoid many of those questions, and assume ET's calculations are "substantially" correct. (We can argue later about whether 99.9% or 95% certainty is enough.) Further, I assume that many people being destroyed in some natural cataclysm (the comet's impact) is a disaster, something those people would fervently wish to avoid.

In ancient times, and even today in some cultures, natural objects were ascribed 'powers,' or they were said to be inhabited or guided by spirits. If that were so, we might have some reason to believe that knowledge of an object or event carries an ethical burden. What that ethical burden might be would depend on the spiritual "nature" of the object. This would be an easy resolution to the problem, but not one I can advocate. The difficulties with this sort of position are many, for example:

To believe this sort of theory requires that I believe some form of animism. By implication, I would have to believe there are mysterious, unseen forces guiding the affairs of the world and fixing moral values on objects. (I say 'mysterious' because no one ever completely explains them.) While many people believe one version or another of that statement, I do not. After thousands of years of trying, no valid proof has been offered of the "spiritual" nature of the world. Moreover, Occam's Razor prompts me to throw out complex and unverified notions when simpler and more direct explanations are available. In other words, limited, scientific knowledge of the natural world is what we can trust, even if only probable. Such knowledge is assumed to be without value (bias), in the ethical sense.

Disregarding the unproven claims of animistic, religious views of the world, many people still want to assert there is something "in" the objects that compels a judgement. Thus, the very nature of nuclear weapons should cause people to condemn them. But, what is that "nature?" Perhaps I should condemn nuclear weapons on account of their nature, but is that something found in the bombs themselves? A nuclear weapon is a complex object, highly machined and organized to perform certain functions when demanded, and otherwise not. Taking the weapon apart does not reveal anything worthy of condemnation. Is it the casing which incites disapproval? How about the stainless steel mirrors? Maybe the plutonium pits are evil, as one reference of the element's name suggests. Taken apart, none of these components has the power of a nuclear weapon. Even the plutonium pit is just a hunk of gray poisonous, radioactive matter. Plutonium is really nasty stuff (incredibly small amounts of it cause lung cancer), but are workers who get near it overcome with a desire to drop the bomb?

An equally valid explanation is that the "nature" of weapons is a human invention; the nature is in our minds, not in the ding an sich. So, it must be the bomb, put together, which makes the weapon we fear, not any of its parts. The whole possesses a quality not found anywhere in the parts, because of the arrangement of things. Without that arrangement, we have just parts; with it, a nuclear weapon. But, would an ant perceive it as a nuclear weapon, or just crawl over it or past it? I think it is the human, or another intelligent being, that grasps the idea of the construction, that the thing is a nuclear weapon. The knowledge of it is entirely in our minds, not in the thing. Otherwise, things are just things. The danger of the weapon is in its design, which must be perceived to be used. So, I must conclude, somewhat with the NRA, that people use guns to injure and kill. Guns don't do it by themselves. The use of a gun is entirely in the mind of the beholder. So, if there is any moral compulsion, it is not in the things of this world but in our knowledge of them.

Motivating Judgement

It is neither moral nor immoral to step on ants, if they don't care about themselves and we don't care about them, in the same sense that we care about ourselves. But, is the same true if the ants care about themselves, but are unable to communicate that concern to us? That brings us back to our last question.

In the law, we distinguish between killing with malice and aforethought, that is murder, and killing without intent or deliberation. There is vehicular manslaughter, for example, which is an unintended killing resulting from misuse of a car. The crime is in the misuse, the manslaughter an incidental consequence. We make the same distinction when using that notorious term, "collateral damage," to describe the presumably innocent victims of war; civilians who got caught in the crossfire, or bystanders in the wrong place at the wrong time. This distinction depends on our being able to propose a "what if?" What if he didn't get drunk ...? What if he was too drunk to start the car, or drive it out of the parking lot ...? There are many what ifs, which point out that the manslaughter required a special set of circumstances to have happened. The driver had to be drunk, but not too drunk, to be capable of the misuse which resulted in a death. The driver is presumed to have been capable of doing otherwise, meaning not getting drunk, not getting in the car, etc. If the driver was a robot, programmed to take each step needed to kill someone, we would impound the robot, but the criminal prosecution would seek to convict the robot's inventor or programmer for the crime. Responsibility for the crime requires the criminal to have made a choice; it cannot have been an unavoidable event.

This suggests that, even if ET has knowledge of impending doom, it is not necessarily responsible for doing anything about it. The putative comet impact is not something ET designed, or put into motion. It is a natural event, and as such has no particular purpose. ET is merely an observer of what is about to happen. It is, after all, the comet which is going to do the exterminating, not ET. This argument is like the notion that 'guns kill people.' There is one difference: in this case, no one pulls the trigger, it just happens. If ET has advance knowledge of the event, but doesn't have the power to change the outcome, this sort of argument might be accepted as an excuse for inaction.

Here, notice: in the case of knowledgeable beings, excuses have to be made for not acting on knowledge of pending harm. This points out the common presumption that moral agents have a duty to act to prevent harm, and possibly to do good as well. When a moral agent responds to a situation, the reaction is defended by an excuse. When a moral agent initiates an action, that action is supported by a justification.

If, however, ET could destroy or deflect the incoming comet, thereby avoiding the death of millions, is there a duty to act? Now, my inclination is to say different things under specifications of the scene. If the millions are ants, beings that (I think) do not care about themselves or their future, then no moral issue is at stake. This is the case when I walk out to my mailbox. On the other hand, if ET is Superman, part of our human society, it seems clear to me there is a duty to do something. That duty does not arise from being asked, or otherwise deputized for the job. Given the circumstances of the problem, no one will know if ET does nothing to stop the comet (which would be a horrible tragedy (for humans). Since only ET will know what it could or could not have done to avoid it, there is no other punishment for whatever it does than self-reproach. It is a matter of conscience, both in the doing or the not-doing.

ET might excuse itself from action and reproach by claiming that, in its minds-eye, humans are so far removed from itself, that they are like ants. It is probably true that human and ET physiology are completely different. The two species have different appendages, different food habits, different needs for clothing, housing, sleep/hibernation, medical care, reproduction, etc, etc. One of the most striking differences, let's say, is ET's ability to molt skins and regenerate body parts, like a salamander; so, an ET very often survives catastrophes like comet impacts and even mild nuclear wars. This was a result of evolution on ET's home planet, a more violent place than Earth. So, ET does not have nearly the sensitivity of Earthlings about death and destruction. Nonetheless, as an advanced creature, it does have a sense of self, and a will to live. As an intelligent being, it can readily conceive that other intelligent beings are like itself. All of the differences do not remove the empathy one creature can have for another. Even naughty boys eventually get some idea of the pain they inflict on the butterflies and frogs they torture. (Most of them stop doing that sooner or later, especially if some pain is inflicted on their behinds.) We humans can imagine what it is like to be caught in the jaws of T-Rex, even a conjured-up 2-dimensional one in "Jurassic Park." It is very difficult for me to imagine that ET does not have these feelings, or ideas if they are not feelings, because of its advanced state. If it does, my problem is solved, for, even if it cares not for those wretched humans, it certainly can be motivated by empathy or identification with those in the situation. This sort of feeling becomes a motive when it launches the "conscience" which nags ET to intervene. That conscience, however developed, has to do with relations between members of a society. ET must find himself in the same society as humans, in so far as they are moral agents, regardless of other developmental differences. It is the same reasoning Westerners use in offering vaccine to remote, primitive villagers. The villagers do not know they will die of whatever disease is going around, but the foreigners know it. So, they explain the situation and offer the prevention. If the villagers refuse it (some do), then whatever happens is on their heads.

The key point in this argument is ET must see the similarity, the likeness, of itself and non-ET others and then apply the ethical principle of treating all moral agents equally. All this supposes ET has some initial motivation - feelings - which sets off the ethical calculation. But, what if, as I suppose ants to be, ET has no feelings? Wouldn't ants think the same of me, if they think? This ET simply doesn't have empathy for others, or the gap between the species is simply too great to have any empathy. In our view, maybe it is more like a very smart robot. (Would such an ET have a personality?) In this case, I admit it is difficult to see why the ET would do anything. There is no spark to light the fuse. Perhaps, somewhere, ET understands the principle of treating others as oneself, and so acts to help the victims out of "sheer logic." But, that is not guaranteed.

Digression: I find it hard to believe any advanced society could be the result of such unfeeling ETs - very smart creatures who are otherwise like ants. I suppose such a society would place little or no value on individuals. This implies almost every social member is like a robot: programmed for a task, and uncaring as to itself. Ants and Bees have reached very complex stages of social evolution, so perhaps my skepticism is unwarranted. Maybe such creatures could eventually build spaceships and everything it takes to run them. If that is so, and they are like that, it won't matter to them what they decide about us.

So, what I find from discussing this situation is an "ought" is inherently social in nature. Even the ET in orbit, who is not asked to intervene to prevent a tragedy, might do so if it can "identify" with those about to be victims. Moral judgement requires a motive, not just an intelligence; it depends upon a certain physical makeup as well as social behavior.

The ET who saves us, solely out of intellectual consideration, probably makes no moral judgement, even if it acts rationally on ethical principles. That ET's action is no different from my avoiding a few ants on the way to the mailbox.

Reprise

For me, these considerations are sufficient to suggest that morality is species-specific. It might be very difficult to correlate any ethical rules some ET follows with human guidelines.

This does not mean there is no ethics, no morality. It only means we must consider carefully how social development characteristic of our species is recognized as a moral code, which is generalized into ethical principles. The human disciplines - psychology, sociology and anthropology - are the required basis for any meaningful ethical theory.

1. Morality arises because there is free will in making ethical choices; i.e., free will is a precondition of any morality. Robots are not moral agents. Thus, an ethical theory must find a way to justify the notion of free will for its actors.

2. This sort of thing has been portrayed in endless science fiction flicks. It doesn't matter whether the "cause" is an earthquake, a flood, or other natural event. I chose the cometary impact, because it is more predictable, once the trajectory is known.